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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
  
Some aspects of the history of social science research in Ireland, such as the work of 
Arensberg and Kimball, have been repeatedly revisited and reappraised. Others have 
been largely ignored and neglected. This paper revisits one such victim of neglect: a 
research project on the morale of Dublin busmen carried out by the Tavistock Institute of 
Human Relations in the early 1960s within the twin contexts of turbulent industrial 
relations and fledgling Irish social science research capacity building. 
 
This working paper does not focus principally on the theoretical framework, fieldwork 
methods or empirical findings of the Tavistock study as published in 1967. Instead it 
examines the abortion of the project as originally conceived at what should have been its 
half-way stage together with the party political rows and media spinning that took place 
over its dead body. 
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Introduction 
Research by members of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations has long held a 
prominent position in the social science literature on work and organisations. It seems 
odd therefore that a substantial Tavistock study carried out in Dublin during the 1960s 
has to date gone virtually unnoticed in discussion of the development of the social 
sciences in Ireland.  
This working paper revisits the neglected study of the morale of Dublin busmen. In doing 
so it focuses in the main not on the theoretical framework or the empirical findings of the 
study as published (Van Beinum 1967) but on the wider socio-political context within 
which the study got bent out of its original shape and became the subject of party political 
manoeuvres and media spinning. Apart from the published report itself, it has two main 
sources. The first is accounts by two members of the Steering Committee that `not only 
formulated and agreed upon the purposes of the study but continued throughout to play a 
vital role in it’ (Van Beinum 1967: Acknowledgements) – CIE Chairman Todd Andrews 
and trade union leader turned academic Charles McCarthy. The second is records of the 
Department of Transport and Power and of the Department of Labour released under 
thirty year rule of the National Archives Act. Before looking at its study of Dublin 
busmen, the paper sketches how the Tavistock Institute became in the words of Minister 
for Transport and Power, Erskine Childers, the  `leading non-profit making organisation 
in Europe dealing with human relations in industry’. 
 
The Tavistock Institute of Human Relations 
 
The Social Department of the Tavistock Clinic was set up after the war to 
carry forward the wartime applications of sociological, anthropological, 
psychological and psychiatric expertise to the problems of peacetime social 
life… in the immediate post-war years the new conceptual frameworks and 
methods for intervening in matters of officer selection, group morale, 
leadership and shell shock all contributed substantially to a dramatically 
altered perception of the nature of the individual’s relation to the activity of 
production. (Miller and Rose 1988: 182)  
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Reorganised, and renamed the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations in 1947, this group 
of researchers produced a series of path-breaking studies of industrial work organisation. 
One of the studies which established the reputation of the Tavistock Institute researchers: 
concerned the `longwall' system of mining coal.  British coal mining had a long history of 
bitter industrial conflict. After the Second World War nationalisation of the mines was 
expected to begin a new, more harmonious era of management-worker relations but did not 
do so. If ownership was not at the root of conflict in the mines what was? Technology came 
under suspicion since `hand got' methods had been displaced by a mechanised `longwall' 
system and older miners continued to express a preference for the old system although the 
conditions associated with it had been anything but pleasant. The Tavistock Institute 
researchers focused on the social implications of this technological change. 
 
Whatever the technology, the productive operation of coal mining consists of a continuously 
repeated cycle in which there are three phases: preparation, getting and advancing. In the 
`hand got' days, tunnels were driven into the coalface creating pillars of uncut coal. These 
were divided up into (6-12 yard) places each of which was allotted to a self-selected six-
member team. Two members of the team worked on each shift. Each team member had to 
have all the skills required to work at the face. the team was paid a lump sum based on its 
output which it divided among itself according to its own rules. The `longwall' was adopted 
in order to make use of the conveyor belt. The working of small places by small teams was 
replaced by the working of several hundred yards of coalface by a large force of narrowly 
specialised workers, with each shift dealing with a different phase of the operation. The new 
system brought in a formal hierarchy of grades and task where there had been broad worker 
equality and it replaced worker self-regulation by extensive managerial co-ordination and 
supervision: both developments caused resentment. The new system was also prone to 
breakdown in acrimony because the unpredictability of mining often meant that a phase was 
incomplete at the end of one shift while the workers coming in were specialised in other 
tasks and would or could not take up where their predecessors had left off. Longwall 
methods therefore fell consistently short of the output they should in theory have been able 
to achieve. 
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The broad lines of the solution propounded by the Tavistock researchers was that the 
method needed to be altered so that a social as well as a technical whole was brought into 
existence. The studies they carried out in Durham involved developing `compositely 
organised' mining teams working on longwalls. In this composite organisational design the 
worker could acquire a wide range of face skills; work-groups are self-selected and share out 
preferred and disliked tasks fairly; they are paid an equally shared bonus in addition to their 
flat-rate pay and they proceed to the next phase of the three phase cycle as it arises rather 
than when a shift changes over. When composite groups were compared with conventional 
ones (and more composite ones with less composite ones) they had higher output, less 
absenteeism and were more effective in keeping the production cycle going. Their members 
also expressed greater feelings of work satisfaction and related better with management.   
 
From this and other studies, a general approach to questions of industrial organisation 
known as socio-technical systems approach evolved. The socio-technical systems approach 
starts out from the premise that within every workplace there is an interaction between two-
distinct systems, one technological and the other social. This approach has as its aim `the 
provision of a precise set of guidelines for creating democratic organisations that are 
excellent in both human and production terms’. To do this a methodology for analysing an 
existing work situation and coming up with proposals that raise both productivity and 
worker satisfaction is needed. Philosophically the socio-technical systems approach rests on 
a view that group decision-making is more effective than a rigid hierarchy of authority. 
What is needed is `to increase the ability of the individual to participate in decision taking 
and in this way to enable him/her to exercise a degree of control over the immediate work 
environment’ (Mumford 1987: 67) 
 
Coras Iompair Eireann 
 
With over 20,000 employees at the start of the 1960s, CIE, the state-owned bus, railway 
and road freight company was the largest single enterprise in the Republic of Ireland. 
Under the terms of the Transport Act 1958 the company was to receive an annual 
subvention of £1.75 million for a five year period after which it would be expected to pay 
its own way. Provided with a large measure of commercial freedom, the new Chairman 
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of CIE, Todd Andrews set about a programme of massive railway line closures and 
organisational reinvigoration in pursuit of this goal. 1961 was to be a fateful year for this 
project: Andrews records in his memoirs that `by 1961 we were within a quarter of a 
million pounds of breaking even financially’ and also that `we had a quiet time on the 
labour front until early in 1961’ (Andrews 2001: 254 and 261).  
 
During 1961 a dispute over payment for weekend working led to a lockout of Dublin 
busmen by CIE. In May 1962 the company moved unilaterally to begin to introduce one-
man buses into its fleet. When busmen who refused to work the new system were 
dismissed, an unofficial strike immediately brought the city’s services to a halt. This 
strike saw the emergence of divisions within the union to which a majority of the busmen 
belonged, the Irish Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU), as disciplinary 
sanctions were imposed by its officials on members deemed guilty of taking part in 
unauthorised demonstrations. Failing to achieve what it considered satisfactory 
negotiated progress on the one-man buses issue, the company attempted to unilaterally 
extend their use a year later: the strike that followed differed from that of the previous 
year in being official. The stoppage in April and May 1963 was to be a critical one: 
according to McCarthy (1973: 63) `the company lost heart with regard to one-man 
operations and never extended the system very much further’ yet the dispute’s eventual 
settlement also `created a crisis in the relations between the men, and the Irish Transport 
in particular, which was to lead to a breakaway movement and the establishing of a new 
union for busmen’  
Bringing the Tavistock Institute to Dublin 
It was against this background that the decision to turn to the Tavistock Institute was 
taken, apparently on Andrews’ initiative and with mixed feelings of the part of union 
leaders (McCarthy 1973: 65): 
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Our failure to bring the bus workers along with us in the really massive effort 
to revive CIE was the biggest disappointment of my public service career. I 
found my inability to cope with them distressing, especially since I believed 
them to be sound and enlightened nationally. Much of their waywardness - it 
could not be called militancy - was due to ineptitude and lack of union 
discipline, but the attitude of the rank and file was sometimes so irrational 
that it suggested the possibility of contributory factors not easily discernible. 
I suggested… that CIE and the…unions should jointly commission the 
Tavistock Institute of Human Relations to make a study of the underlying 
causes of the poor morale of the busmen (Andrews 2001: 269)    
  
The project that emerged was sponsored by CIE, three unions representing the busmen 
and the National Joint Committee on the Human Sciences and Their Application to 
Industry (HSC). The HSC was probably the first body involved in providing public 
funding support for the creation of a social science research infrastructure in Ireland. It 
had been set up in 1958, alongside the Irish National Productivity Committee (INPC), to 
liase with the European Productivity Agency (EPA) which formed an autonomous part of 
the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).  During its lifetime it 
had unsuccessfully sought funding for a research institute, had sent potential Irish 
research workers abroad for training under schemes operated by the EPA, had organised 
conferences and seminars (particularly in the area of ergonomics) and collaborated with 
Dutch researchers on a sociological study of the hinterland of Shannon Airport  
 
EPA was disbanded as part of the process by which OEEC was in 1961 reinvented as the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development but `before E.P.A. went out 
of existence the [INPC] arranged for it to make a substantial grant to this country to 
finance research in the Human Sciences field’.  With greater access to funds than it had 
hitherto enjoyed, the HSC helped finance two substantive studies – the Tavistock CIE 
project and the Skibbereen survey carried out by J.A. Jackson (1967)  – prior to its 
incorporation into a revamped INPC in 1964 (Murray 2004). The Chairman and 
Secretary of the HSC were, alongside CIE and union representatives, members of a 
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Steering Committee set up to assist in the general direction of the Tavistock project. In 
January 1966 Charles McCarthy, General Secretary of the Vocational Teachers’ 
Association and a prominent figure within the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) 
took over as HSC Chairman and joined this Steering Committee.   
Todd Andrews and Charles McCarthy on the Tavistock Study 
In Andrews’ memoirs the account of his motivation in proposing the Tavistock study 
quoted above is followed by this brief, dismissive reference to the study’s report: 
 
Dr. Van Beinum's report did not throw much new light on the problem. 
Wages, as we suspected, were not the dominant issue; busmen's earnings 
were not bad by the public-service standards of the time. The major sources 
of discontent seemed to derive from stresses peculiar to the job itself and the 
demanding conditions under which the men worked, as well as lack of 
opportunities for advancement and promotion. Busmen do not appear to 
differ much from the rest of humanity in their motivation… weaknesses in 
trade union management and organization were at the root of the labour 
problems which beset CIE in my time. (Andrews 2001: 269-271) 
 
His fellow Steering Committee member, McCarthy, by contrast, draws attention to the 
two-phase conception with which the project started out but did not finish up: 
 
It was recognised that such a study could reflect both on CIE and on the trade 
unions, and in order to overcome this problem, but more important, in order 
that the study should be a catalyst by which improvements would be made, it 
was agreed that the survey itself would merely be the first phase; the second 
phase would be a joint examination of the results and a series of joint 
measures to effect improvements. The eventual publication (and it was clear 
from the start that the results would be published) would contain not only the 
survey, but the steps which both management and unions had taken as a 
result of it. In this way, improvements would be effected and hostile criticism 
circumvented. (McCarthy 1973: 65-66) 
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The first phase, which was carried out by a team of five researchers directed by Hans Van 
Beinum, got under way in September 1963. Apart from some additional work carried out 
in 1965 on trade union organisation, its fieldwork appears to have concluded in the 
Summer of 1964. The report of the study went through three drafts between late 1964 and 
the end of 1965 (Van Beinum 1967: 4).  The key issues investigated were the socio-
technical characteristics of the jobs the busmen had to carry out; the management the 
busmen experienced, directly and indirectly; the relationship between the busmen and 
their unions and the shared attitudes of busmen towards these matters and towards their 
position in general. The data collection ranged across semi-structured group interviews 
with drivers and conductors, observation of a sample of different types of bus “run” and 
extended interviews with the observed crews, interviews with management at different 
levels and interviews with trade union officials and representatives. As anticipated, the 
reflection was unflattering: 
Morale is low. The way in which the work situation is perceived is 
predominantly negative and, without exaggeration our findings can be 
regarded as disquieting… The coming phase of evaluation and action will be 
more difficult than the research stage now behind us. It will demand an even 
greater commitment and support and will require a frame of reference which 
is securely based in shared values (Van Beinum 1967: 89 and 91)  
Why the Tavistock Study Had No Second Phase 
While Van Beinum expressed the view that such a shared set of values did exist, other 
evidence suggests that perhaps the only thing CIE management and the unions shared by 
the mid-1960s was a deep mistrust of one another. The carrying out of the Tavistock 
fieldwork in late 1963 and through much of 1964 coincided with a lull in overt hostilities, 
during which the breakaway busmen’s movement failed to find a home in either of the 
ITGWU’s two rival general unions and went through the process of creating a new 
licensed union. Thereafter industrial conflict returned with a vengeance as the new 
National Busmen’s Union (NBU) launched a series of one-day strikes to which the 
company responded by resorting to a lockout.  Nor did the NBU have a monopoly over 
militancy. In the Summer of 1966 a further protracted strike by Workers Union of Ireland 
members over garage maintenance workers’ wages took place. 
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Given the task of holding discussions that might lead to improved industrial relations 
within CIE, officials of the newly-created Department of Labour discovered in late 1966 
that within the leadership of the established ICTU-affiliated unions at CIE there prevailed 
a mixture of expectation and hope that the NBU would succumb to infant mortality and 
disappear within a couple of years. These unions treated the NBU as a `splinter union’ 
with which they did not fraternise or co-operate although their members would not pass 
NBU pickets. On the part of the NBU there was disinterest in CIE’s negotiating 
structures and in the union groupings that operated within those structures. This was 
hardly a situation conducive to taking the joint action the second phase of the Tavistock 
study envisaged. 
 
Before the discussions initiated by the Department of Labour got under way, the Minister 
for Transport and Power, Erskine Childers, had written to his colleague the Minister for 
Labour, Patrick Hillery, on 31 August 1966: “no doubt you will wish to examine this 
[Tavistock] report”. By the time they were allowed to lapse in early 1967, with no 
prospect of progress in sight, not a single reference to the Tavistock study is to be found 
in the discussion records. What the unions were highlighting was the issue of the subsidy 
received by CIE, blaming the inadequacy of this (contra Andrews, quoted above) for low 
wages and an absence of meaningful negotiation on the part of management. For a united 
front of CIE management and the Department of Transport and Power, on the other hand, 
the key issue was a multiplicity of malfunctioning unions with Childers in his letter to 
Hillery of 31 August following his reference to the Tavistock report by the statement:  
 
 No enquiry into CIE is worth anything unless it provides for group union 
reorganisation with statistical and secretarial help, better methods of balloting 
and plenipotentiary powers for unions, and explanations on the position of 
CIE. CIE workers are not told of comparable conditions in other transport 
systems. If CIE is asked “why did you not increase the maintenance workers’ 
wages before” the answer is given above: splinter union negotiation, huge 
claims by NBU, rivalry in securing better remuneration and the utter inability 
of CIE to negotiate on a long-term basis so that escalation is non-existent.1 
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Playing Politics with the Report and Managing Media Coverage of its Publication 
 
The disinterest in the Tavistock report shown by the participants in the Department of 
Labour discussions was not, however, universally shared: 
 
Material from the survey was also leaked to the newspapers; it was referred to 
publicly by some of CIE management, and versions of it were circulating among 
the busmen. Eventually, the survey itself was published in 1966 but without any 
follow-through report as was originally intended.  (McCarthy 1973: 66) 
 
In fact publication did not in fact take place until August 1967 (more than a year and a 
half after a final draft was written) and by then the list of those making public use of the 
still unpublished Tavistock included a Cabinet Minister. Repeated disruptions of the 
capital city’s main public transport service inevitably had political repercussions and the 
Minister for Transport and Power found himself faced with opposition party calls for a 
public inquiry into the state of CIE. At a press conference in August 1966 Childers turned 
to the work of what he termed the `leading non-profit making organisation in Europe 
dealing with human relations in industry’ to fend off this public inquiry demand:  
 
It is extraordinary that the Fine Gael Party, apparently with the objective of 
creating agitation among the staff of CIE for political purposes, have ignored the 
existence of the [Tavistock] report, which has been in the hands of the unions 
for some months for reprocessing and republication in more usual terms of 
speech, the document being highly technical in language.  
The Tavistock Institute is an independent organisation of international repute. 
The personnel included Irishmen of eminent ability. I have no intention of 
holding a public inquiry when such an independent report is available.2  
 
Made on the same day as his letter to Hillery was specifying what an `enquiry… worth 
anything’ must do, this statement was somewhat disingenuous. As regards the handling 
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of the report’s publication, a version rather different to trade union reprocessing was 
given on 17 November in a letter written by CIE’s General Manager: 
 
 Latest information is that the Human Sciences Committee will arrange 
publication in December. The reason for the delay is that the Tavistock 
Institute was asked to contribute some additional chapters on the 
methodology employed. Neither the trade unions nor CIE have seen these 
chapters but it is understood they will not cause alteration of the text in the 
main body of the Report. It is expected that all three parties will contribute to 
a press release at the time of publication. This is not certain yet, but there is 
no doubt about general anxiety concerning the manner in which the Report 
and its contents are presented to the public.3 
 
In fact publication did not take place until the following August and CIE then acted 
unilaterally to try and influence the report’s presentation by the press through briefings 
given to journalists in which: 
 
The main points made were (a) that the report was four years old and, therefore, 
out of date and (b) that the conditions which now exist in Dublin City services 
have altered materially for the better from those of four years ago4 
 
The results of this exercise were mixed. The Irish Times piece - headlined “Report’s 
Findings Overtaken By Time” – regurgitated the CIE line: the other Dublin dailies’ 
headlines either emphasised the report’s findings (“Discontent Rife Among Dublin 
Busmen”) or recalled long-abandoned aspirations of the study’s original conception 
(“New Blueprint for CIE. Report Urges Experiment in Industrial Relations”). Writing to 
Childers, CIE’s General Manager was “satisfied it is unlikely that any of  [the 
newspapers] will be interested in re-opening or developing the subject”. He predicted that 
the report “will be forgotten very quickly”5 – as indeed it has been, apart from the brief 
references in Andrews’ memoirs and the more extensive meditations of McCarthy (1971 
and 1973) on a lost opportunity to experiment with industrial democracy in Ireland. 
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Conclusion 
The Tavistock study came into existence trailing background assumptions about the 
peculiar mental state of the Dublin busman. To Andrews (2002: 269) `the attitude of the 
rank and file was sometimes so irrational that it suggested the possibility of contributory 
factors not easily discernible’. According to McCarthy (1973: 65) `CIE and the unions 
were deeply troubled by the strong feelings which lay behind the [1963 one-man buses] 
dispute, and, perhaps believing that they had done all that was expected of them, they 
began to look for the cause in some deeper malaise among the men’. Earlier in 1958, 
when all was still fairly quiet on the CIE labour front, the company’s medical officers had 
suggested as a topic for research to the newly created HSC `neoreses [sic] in bus crews, a 
greater problem in Dublin than in rural districts’. 6 
 
The published report, however, contains a chapter - “Some Considerations About the 
Relation Between the Role of the Trade Union in Modern Society and the Attitudes of the 
Busmen” – which parallels, if it does not anticipate, theorisations by the 1960s Affluent 
Worker team with regard to working class images of society and orientations to work: 
 
Class consciousness is changing into self consciousness. We can speak of the 
`privatisation’ of the worker, by which we mean the tendency to evaluate the 
affairs of the world in terms of his own needs, rather than in terms of the needs 
of the traditional social group of which he is a part (Van Beinum 1967: 79) 
  
While this perspective discounted the Marxist stress on the centrality of class, it did, as 
noted by Westergaard (1970), represent a `rediscovery of the cash nexus’ upon which 
Marx had laid so much stress. Placed within a cash nexus context, CIE’s busmen cease to 
appear irrational, neurotic or stricken by some mysterious malaise. If commercial logic 
was to shape CIE’s service output, then why should it not determine the wages of the 
company’s employees too? The busmen worked in a service that made a profit but, 
because the government was determined to limit its subvention to the public transport 
sector as a whole, these profits were cross-subsidising losses being incurred elsewhere. 
As McCarthy (1973: 59) notes this was a situation in which the company `tended to give 
increases belatedly and after hard bargaining’ leaving the busmen `understandably 
aggrieved’. Looking back, Andrews (2001: 274) was to conclude that CIE could have 
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broken even only by closing down the state’s entire railway system – a course of action 
he would have been willing to pursue but one which lay outside the realm of the 
politically possible.   
 
In the end politics was in command at CIE. Whenever the size of the subvention issue 
was raised, the standard response of the Minister for Transport and Power was to 
translate any size of increase into a rise of so many pence in the price of a gallon of 
petrol. The public transport system had to pay its way because private motoring was 
government policy’s most favoured transport mode. The two-man bus with its open 
platform at the back is now a museum piece but the public policy bias context of the way 
in which its threatened demise triggered off an explosion of conflict within CIE in the 
early 1960s has retained an enduring relevance down to the present day.  
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NOTES 
 
1 National Archives, Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 2001/50/228 
2 Irish Times 1 September 1966 
3 National Archives, Department of Transport, Energy and Communications RTS 13/42 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 National Archives, Department of Industry and Commerce MIS/1/8 
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